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Economic Returns on Historic Properties
RALPH C. MENAPACE, JR.*
Certain problems are raised in the measurement of eco-
nomic returns on properties subject to landmark regulation and
in the evaluation of the adequacy of those returns. The focus of
my talk will be the hardship relief provisions of the New York
City Landmarks Law under which an owner may apply to the
Landmarks Commission for a Certificate of Appropriateness;
this certificate would permit the alteration or demolition of the
landmark structure because of insufficient return.1
The more aggressive enforcement of the New York City
Landmarks Law which is expected in light of the Penn Central2
decision and the increase in the numbers of commercial proper-
ties designated as landmarks may bring these hardship provi-
sions into increased prominence in the near future as more own-
ers seek relief. As of this date, no one has successfully
prosecuted an application for economic hardship before the New
York City Commission.
Substantial restrictions can be placed on historic structures
in the interest of landmark preservation without payment of
compensation to the owners of the properties. If, however, the
restrictions go too far, or, in the words of the Supreme Court,
have an "unduly harsh impact" on a particular property, the
owner must be given relief from the restrictions or paid compen-
sation; if not, the regulation constitutes a taking. It is unclear
how to determine how far is too far or what is "unduly harsh."
The Supreme Court suggests various verbal formulations of
this concept: one is that the owner must be left with a "reasona-
ble beneficial use" of the property;4 another is that the property,
as regulated, must be "economically viable";5 a third is that the
property, as regulated, must be capable of yielding a "reasonable
return" to its owner." A fair conclusion is that the court deliber-
ately avoided any single formulation and may, in future cases,
approve various methods of applying a hardship test.
It is clear, however, that economic hardship will be consid-
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ered by the Court. Legislatures must, therefore, address the
problem and landmark preservation laws must in some way pro-
vide relief to those landmark owners who can show economic
hardship. In the Penn Central case, the affirmance of the New
York court's decision was based on the Supreme Court's view
that a continuing process was involved. Penn Central could
come back with a plan for a smaller or different tower. If the
economic situation should change or if Penn Central could make
a better case proving its economic hardship, some relief would
have to be offered.
The New York City Landmarks Law has provisions, enacted
before Penn Central, which address the difficult issues involved
in determining what constitutes a sufficient economic return on
lan'dmark properties.'
The owner of a building or other structure designated as a
landmark, who can establish that the "improvement parcel,"
which includes the structure, "is not capable of earning a rea-
sonable return" - defined by the statute as six percent of the
value of the property9 - may apply to the Landmarks Preserva-
tion Commission for a Certificate of Appropriateness to alter or
demolish the improvement on the ground of insufficient return.10
Normally the value of the property is the assessed value for real
estate tax purposes, but in certain limited circumstances, the
statute permits the Commission to find another valuation." If
the parcel involved is not tax exempt, and if the applicant shows
a good faith intent to proceed "immediately" (in the case of
demolition) or "with reasonable promptness" (in the case of al-
teration), the Commission must within a specified period de-
velop a plan to preserve the landmark and generate a reasonable
return thereon for the owner. 12 Such a plan, subject to approval
of the Board of Estimate, may consist solely or in part of exemp-
tion from real estate taxes."3 If no acceptable plan is developed
within the specified time, the Commission may recommend to
the Mayor that the city acquire the property by condemnation
or otherwise.14 If no such recommendation is made, or if the city
does not elect to acquire property, the owner is then free to pro-
ceed with the proposed alteration or demolition. 5
The situation with respect to tax-exempt properties differs
in that the statute has no express remedy for the property owner
unless, in addition to insufficient return, the owner shows (1)
[Vol. 1:681
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol1/iss3/19
ECONOMIC RETURNS
that he has entered into an agreement to sell the property, (2)
that the proposed purchaser has a good faith intent to proceed
promptly with a proposed alteration or demolition upon
purchase, and (3) that the improvement is no longer adequate to
fulfill the purposes of the owner to which it is and had been
devoted. If these additional showings are made, the Commission
must within a specified period find a purchaser who is willing to
purchase the property subject to the landmark restrictions and
on terms and conditions reasonably equivalent to those offered
by the original proposed purchaser. Failing this, the Commission
may recommend to the Mayor that the city condemn or other-
wise acquire the property. If this is not done within a specified
period, the owner is free to proceed with the sale of the prop-
erty, and the purchaser can proceed with alteration or
demolition. 6
The statutory provisions with respect to tax-exempt proper-
ties do not provide a remedy for the owner who wishes to retain
title to the property and alter or demolish it for his own pur-
poses. However, the New York courts in Sailors' Snug Harbor,7
Lutheran Church,'8 and Penn Central, held that if the owner
could show maintenance of the landmark physically or
financially prevents or seriously interferes with the charitable
purposes of the owner, a court would imply a remedy, which, as
in the Lutheran Church case, might be to free the property from
all restrictions under the Landmarks Law.
Is "reasonable return" as defined by the New York statute
sufficient to constitute a "reasonable return" which will satisfy
the constitutional standard established in Penn Central? Is six
percent a sufficient rate of return? Assessed value for tax pur-
poses may be significantly less than fair market value. Rent con-
trol precedents suggest that six percent may be held to be a suf-
ficient rate of return.19 The Supreme Court's reference to
"investment-backed expectations"20 further suggests that as long
as actual cost to the owner of the landmark does not signifi-
cantly exceed assessed value, no serious constitutional problem
is posed. It may be advisable to consider amendment of the stat-
ute to relate the rate of return in some way to the prime rate of
interest, although the extreme fluctuations in the prime rate in
recent years makes this questionable. Retaining the six percent
rate will create problems in future litigation.
19811
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It is not clear in New York today whether assessment for
tax purposes reflects to any extent the burden of landmark re-
strictions. Would partial or total exclusion from assessed value
of the property of the value of development rights not useable
because of landmark regulation pose a problem? The constitu-
tional requirement that property be capable of earning a "rea-
sonable return" refers to the return on the value of property af-
ter regulation, rather than the value absent regulation. Penn
Central would be undercut if the reasonable return test were
based on a valuation of the property based on the "highest and
best use."
Certain factors considered in determining whether constitu-
tional standards are met may not be held to be relevant in de-
termining whether the statutory six percent return test has been
met. For example, it is not clear whether the availability of pos-
sible air rights transfers can or should be considered. The statu-
tory test refers to the capability of the property to yield the re-
quired return under "reasonably efficient and prudent
management. ' 21 Therefore, it is possible to argue that revenue
from air rights transfers should be considered, since diligent
management would at least explore the possibility of deriving
revenues from such transfers.
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court rejected the conten-
tion that air rights over the Terminal should be viewed as a
property interest separate from the Terminal, a property inter-
est that was completely destroyed when the railroad was denied
permission to build an office tower over the Terminal. In doing
so, the Court approved as the relevant property unit, even
though it was not literally applicable, the unit defined in the
Landmarks Law, that is, the city tax lot that includes the
landmark structure.2 2 What about the possibility of arguing
hardship by subdividing landmark properties so as to create in-
terests which would be completely demolished by the regula-
tion? The New York statute prohibits that.2 If the landmark
involves more than one tax lot at the time of designation, the
several tax lots together constitute the applicable unit for deter-
mining hardship. 4
The application of Rockefeller Center Incorporated (RCI)
for a Certificate of Appropriateness to demolish Radio City Mu-
sic Hall poses another aspect of this problem. In this case the
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tax lot in which the Music Hall is located covers the entire city
block from Fifth to Sixth Avenues between 50th and 51st
Streets and includes several substantial office buildings as well
as the Music Hall. RCI contended at the public hearing on its
application that, notwithstanding statutory language, the Com-
mission, to be fair, should treat the Music Hall and the land
under it, exclusive of the remaining land and buildings, as the
relevant unit for determining the adequacy of the economic re-
turn. Although not without merit, the contention is difficult to
sustain in light of the clear language of the statute, which speaks
of the return upon the "improvement parcel(s) which includes
the landmark." The term "improvement parcel" is defined as
the unit of real estate which includes the landmark and the
landmark site "which is treated as a single entity for the purpose
of levying real estate taxes. '2 5 Moreover, the difficulties raised in
determining the proper allocation of real estate taxes as between
the Music Hall and the office structures also included in the tax
lot suggest that reasons of practicality militate against the con-
tention of RC. Furthermore, the decision to keep the entire
complex of buildings in one tax block is a decision made by the
owner, and, therefore, it is arguable that the owner should have
to live with the consequences of that decision.
A related issue is presented by the "flagship" theory which
was advanced by the Court of Appeals in its decision in Penn
Central2 ' The Court of Appeals there stated that some part of
the revenues of Penn Central's properties in the area around
Grand Central could fairly be attributed to the Terminal by
analogy to a "flagship" store in a shopping center which draws
business for the entire shopping center.27 Even though the Su-
preme Court did not comment on this argument, it may have
some relevance in the Music Hall situation. The Music Hall, as
one of the amenities of Rockefeller Center, arguably is responsi-
ble in some measure for the economic success of the office build-
ings in the entire complex.
The application to the Commission of Radio City Music
Hall for a Certificate of Appropriateness raises another question.
The land underlying the Music Hall - and most of Rockefeller
Center - is owned by Columbia University and leased on a
long-term basis to RCI. Thus, there is a dual ownership of the
"improvement parcel" which includes the Music Hall: Columbia
19811
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owns the underlying land and RCI owns the buildings, subject to
Columbia's reversionary interest in the buildings upon expira-
tion of the lease.
At the public hearing on its application, RCI showed ground
rent as an expense item in the income statements for the Music
Hall - which showed significant losses. Although no explana-
tion of this treatment of ground rent was presented, presumably
the rationale is that the buildings, exclusive of the underlying
land, can and should be treated as the relevant economic unit in
determining economic hardship.
The appropriate economic unit should include both the land
and the building. Nothing in the language of the statute would
appear to sanction the division of buildings from land in the
"improvement parcel" any more than there is sanction for sepa-
rating the landmark structure, including its underlying land,
from the unused air rights above the landmark. The statute de-
fines the improvement parcel to include all of the land and all of
the improvements within the tax lot which includes the
landmarks, open land, and other improvements. The capability
of earning a return on that unit is called for by the statute. This
makes economic sense, since to hold otherwise could require the
demolition of a landmark because the terms of a ground lease
unduly favored the owner of land as against the lessee.
The statute does not contemplate a horizontal division of
the improvement parcel any more than it 'contemplates a verti-
cal division. There would seem to be even less justification in
policy since "economic viability" of the property should be
viewed in terms of the parcel as a whole: the Supreme Court
took this view and looked at the parcel as a whole when Penn
Central attempted to treat the air rights over the Terminal as
separate from the Terminal.2 8 In any event, RCI itself uses the
combined assessed valuation of the land and structures in quan-
tifying the six percent return that it asserts it should be receiv-
ing on the property.
The problems posed in determining the adequacy of return
on landmarked properties are complex and difficult. They in-
volve issues as different as tax assesment policies and the legal
and practical aspects of air rights transfers. All that is clear is
that these issues will be increasingly in the forefront of preserva-
tion law.
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